# Next off

we affirm Mestiza Double Consciousness as a method of resistance to status quo indefinite detention policies.

**Mestiza Consciousness cannot account for the lived experiences of Afro-Peruvians. It ignores how race shapes the experience and desires of different types of Peruvian women. Mestiza Double Consciousness solves best.**

Falcon 8, <http://www.academia.edu/179084/Mestiza_Double_Consciousness_The_Voices_of_Afro-Peruvian_Women_on_Gendered_Racism>

Perú, similar to many countries in the Americas, is haunted by the legacy of slavery (Bowser 1974; Bühnen 1993; Harth-Terré 1973; Hunefeldt 1994). This racial context places Afro-Peruvians, especially women, in a borderland that is not only about physical location but also about struggle (Anzaldúa 1999). Afro-Peruvian women are caught amid visibility and invisibility within dominant Peruvian society that oppressively sexualizes or belittles them in one setting and ignores them in another. Peruvians largely view racism as a North American problem, but this perspective has begun to change.1 In this article I propose a confluence of W. E. B. Du Bois’s “double consciousness” (1903/1982) and Gloria Anzaldúa’s “*mestiza* consciousness” (1999) to analyze the experiences of three Afro-Peruvian women. I met Sofía, Mónica, and Martha while conducting interviews about women’s experiences at the third United Nations (UN) World Conference Against Racism, Xenophobia, Racial Discrimination and Related Intolerance (herein WCAR) held in Durban, South Africa from August 31 to September 8, 2001. As they were the only three Black women from Perú to attend the WCAR 2001, they bring a unique vantage point about gender and race to the table as Afro-Peruvian women. Transcending both literal and figurative borders, as well as resisting and overcoming the borders placed on them by a patriarchal and racist society, their articulations contribute to a reconceptualization of Black women’s identities in Perú by accounting for gender, sexuality, and importantly, the transnationality of the African Diaspora (Clarke and Thomas 2006; Gaspar and Hine 1996; Harris 1982; Knight, Talib, and Curtin 1989).

**Even the discourse of “mestiza” renders Afro-Peruvian women invisible**

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The image of the *mestiza*, upon which *mestiza* consciousness emerges,

reflects certain experiences based on a particular type of body despite the

influence of *mestizaje*. *Mestizaje* refers to the racial mixture of African,

indigenous, and Spanish descent in Latin America resulting from a history

of colonialism and conquest. However, the common conceptualization of

*mestizaje* largely renders African (and indigenous) heritage invisible

(Saldaña-Portillo 2003). Therefore, expanding mestizaje to include experiences

beyond the *mestizo/a* body itself validates the pluralities of lived

realities in the borderlands because of its effect on *mestiza* consciousness.

Inclusion of the “organic hybridity” (Bhavnani 2000) of the African

descendant in the Americas offers us a more comprehensive discourse and

theory about their borderland existence.

**Mestiza consciousness is a good attempt, but is ultimately saturated by the racism of colonial Peru, which sees women as sexualized objects because of their race.**

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The *testimonios* of Sofía, Mónica, and Martha detail the overt and covert displays of racial antagonism through a consideration of the plight of Afro-Peruvians in general as well as their issues as women in particular. For Du Bois, double consciousness occurred because of the racism perpetuated by whites, which left Blacks in a space of inner struggle. My application of Du Bois’s concept to these *testimonios* is to demonstrate how my interviewees use double consciousness to interpret and understand “the eyes of others.” Their stories show that by gendering double consciousness, we have a better understanding about how survival in their borderlands requires a navigation of multiple and intersecting worlds based on race, gender, and nation (Collins 2000; Cooper 1892). Sofía shares a story that could have been experienced by any woman of African descent in the Americas. She goes to the water company because of an error in her bill. When it is her turn to approach the next customer service representative, she greets the young man politely. He eventually says, “You people are distinct, right?” She replies, “Distinct?” She has a bad feeling about where this conversation is headed. He then elaborates: “Distinct . . . you Black/dark women.” Sofía pushes him further. He becomes deeply embarrassed by Sofía’s persistent questioning and tells her he once had a Black girlfriend and that she knows exactly to what he is alluding. She replies, “I want you to tell me how we Black women are distinct. Those are the stupidities that many of you have in your head about us.” Sofía knows from the initial remark about being “distinct” that he is referring to Black female sexuality and stereotypes about sex with Black women. She is deeply offended by his remarks. She sees this view as a relic from the colonial period when enslaved Black women had no choice but to be raped at the discretion of their owners/masters. She says, They don’t analyze the colonial period when we were part of the property of the owner. And whenever the owner wanted, we had no voice, no vote [about being with him]. We were his property. And that resulted in many consequences. Many killed themselves. Many had abortions so that their children would not have the same fate. Sofía’s moment of double consciousness occurs when she understands what the customer service representative is suggesting when he makes his initial comments to her. And her “dogged strength” emerges by challenging him to the point of embarrassing him. Her experience occurs because the male representative read her identity as both raced and gendered, and he reacts accordingly.

#### Their method essentializes all mestiza bodies, erasing black mestizas. This allows for the continuation of imperialism.

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Gendered interpretation of racialized realities and agency is at the core of *mestiza* double consciousness. In other words, through recognition of multiple borderlands and understanding the crucial role of transnational solidarity in combating racism, my interviewees embody a *mestiza* double consciousness. They elucidate a form of gendered racism particular to their experience as women of African descent in Latin America and actively resist racism by seeking out local and international alliances (i.e., WCAR 2001 and postconference work). However, for transnational solidarity to emerge between the Global North and the Global South, linking issues and experiences alone is insufficient (*Meridians* 2000, 4) because of the existence of deep political cleavages that are consequences of U.S. privilege and power. For example, African and Afro-Latina women “forcefully called attention to the ways Southern women had been silenced and marginalized in the UN World Conference Against Racism process” (Nguyen 2001, 25) and formed a “South-South Initiative” to assess the region-specific issues facing women from Africa, Asia-Pacific, Latin America, and Caribbean locations. Yet, as I discuss in this article, essentializing the experiences of people of color based in the Global North, especially African Americans in this case, is also problematic given the historic role that many African American feminists, such as Angela Davis, the late June Jordan, and bell hooks, have played in trying to immobilize U.S. imperialism and racism.

#### Only double consciousness can understand the experiences of black Latinas.

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Some scholars highlight the parallel struggles of U.S. Blacks and U.S. Latina/os vis-à-vis the work of Du Bois and Anzaldúa (Martinez 2002), but I am arguing for an intersection and expansion of Du Bois and Anzaldúa. Whereas Du Bois narrated the lives of African Americans in the United States at the turn of the century through the lens of double consciousness, and Anzaldúa theorized the complex existence of Chicanas through her discussion of *mestiza* consciousness, the lives of Sofía, Mónica, and Martha can be understood by neither framework alone. Rather, their liminal identities and experiences as racialized women in a country of the Global South require a conversation between the ideas of Du Bois and Anzaldúa. By gendering double consciousness and expanding *mestiza* consciousness beyond the United States and the U.S.-Mexico borderlands, we can better understand how women’s agency plays a role in what I refer to as *mestiza* double consciousness. Through their activism and preparation for the WCAR 2001 and within their respective organizations and political communities, Sofía, Mónica, and Martha have come to understand their own social position within Peruvian society and Latin America differently than before they became politically engaged at the international level. And it is the development of this differing perspective that results in the formation of *mestiza* double consciousness.

# off

**Claims of reform from within are just propaganda – any criticism or attempt at real reform is harshly repressed. Obama gets away with it because his imperialism looks benign compared to Bush’s naked abuse of power.**

John **Jones 2011** (“Obama’s Incredible Lightness of Empire” accessed in Experiments with Peace: Celebrating Peace on Johan Galtung's 80th Birthday, published February 1 2011, p. 117-124) John Jones is an assistant professor of education at Truman State University.

Understanding the pro-Obama sentiment The change in atmosphere radiating from Washington with Obamas coming to power, and the hope and enthusiasm aroused when he visited Cairo and Berlin during 2009, must have been decisive in Obamas nomi­nation. But to really understand the committees choice of Obama one also needs to acknowledge the effect of the dark days of the G. W. Bush presidency on the rest of the world. With its economic neoliberalism and revenge-based military policies, its War on Terror rationale after the 9/11 tragedy, and its blasphemous use of religious language and symbols, the US had become incomprehensible if not entirely unacceptable. In Europe, people celebrated Obamas entry onto the world stage and the end of Bush's hostilities: deeply ingrained and servile pro-American sentiments as well as Europe's own warmongering tendencies had seen leaders follow Bush blindly. The response to Bush's call to war had been just like that of Ibsen's obedient but "protesting" bourgeois character: "I have to follow, I suppose, but I protest to all the world"(Black 1928: 555). For years this had resulted in a growing distance between Europe's people and their leaders. It had become hard to defend the US as a beacon of democracy even for its hard core friends, when one learnt about the secret prisons all over the world; covert arrests and flights at night; privatised armies; the invention of a new, sub-human, species named "illegal combatants", un­worthy of human treatment or protection by treaties or under the laws of war; disregard for human rights, the Geneva Conventions, decency and deeply established humane attitudes. Unprecedented numbers of Euro­peans took to the streets, protesting about the lack of action from their own leaders in the face of all of this. American protests, if there were any, were given hardly any coverage by Murdoch and other dominating news syndicates. Behind Europeans leaders' servility and their failure to stand up to Bush's bullying (France was an exception), also lurked their fear of be­ing marginalised in the American-led global economic race, the military industrial bonanza and battle for energy, technological development and trade regimes, which had all become more aggressive during the 1990s. Left with the choice of being either "with" or "against" the Bush regime, parties changed their policies, critical voices became silent and cameras were switched off. Editors were gagged, or censored themselves, and art­ists saw the spirit of McCarthyism reappearing. No wonder we celebrated: Obama was a dream come true, which instantly wiped out that dark and recent history from our collective memory. Obama was the Kennedys, Kings and American Dream and the embodiment of Bob Dylan's "the times they are a'changing". Youth, beauty and truth. The Nobel Committees arguments The Nobel Committee acted accordingly. Obama had created a window onto a world that Nobel had envisaged and for which the Nobel Com­mittee offered itself as the pulpit. Undeniably, committee chair Jaglands arguments seemed closer to Nobel's will than those put forward for many other recent nominations. The arguments were that Obama had strengthened international diplomacy and co-operation between peoples encouraged international work against nuclear weapons created a new climate for international politics and talks put the UN back on centre stage underlined international dialogue and negotiations taken an active role in climate negotiations signalled a new dawn for true democracy and human rights Yes, Obamas actions were "only" acts of speech - speech acts. But if those aren't political achievements, what are? The Nobel Committee concluded that rarely had the world witnessed a person who had so embodied hope and promise for the future as Obama had done during his short time in power. And his first year as president was not even over yet. He acted in line with the idea that world leaders must base their actions on values and attitudes that apply to all people. Obama, the committee summed up, was no less than "the best spokesperson and stimulator for what the Nobel Committee has worked for throughout its 108 year history"! This is a remarkable line, since it singles out Obama among all Nobel Peace laureates! With Obama heading for Oslo, expectations for the renowned ora­tor's Nobel acceptance speech ran high. Afro-American spirituality, elo­quence and warmth were reasons for high expectations. Youth, beauty and truth. The speech Obama often writes his own speeches and always delivers them with op­timal control of the audience. And, yes, he delivers his speeches, he doesn't just read them. He is a good improviser, an alert listener, and can include new elements as he goes along, commenting on a remark or a word from the audience, making a soft joke or comment, and seeing his speech dy­namically evolving into convincing and moving arguments. And even if Obamas Nobel speech was written and printed beforehand, it still had that flow and ease that characterises Obama at his best. A lot has been said about Obamas musicality and dramatic tech­niques, his Kennedy-like coolness, his wonderfully phrased language ("the cultural levelling of modernity" or "we are the heirs of the fortitudes and foresights of generations past"). I will let that rest. Obama is first of all a genuine and likable fellow, and radiates positivity, youth and energy. He had gained political success, not only because of the way he expressed his message, but undoubtedly also because of its content: people needed change, and he captured that word. They were fed up with hostility and war, and he gave them promises of peace. They wanted a reaching-out and a dialogue without threats, and he promised to pull out of Iraq. They were tired of fists, and he offered an outstretched hand. They wanted Wall-street hazards curbed and their lieutenants held accountable, and he promised to look to the high street and help the over-mortgaged. The importance of sequencing The first part of Obamas speech dealt with why he chose to wage war, and the second with how to avoid it. By organising the argument in this way, he was able to cater for the hawks around the world and assure them that he was no pacifistic dreamer, and still leave the listener with the idea that peace will triumph in the end. After greeting the audience in his first paragraph, in the next, not surprisingly, he sets the tone of peace by a reference to two representatives of nonviolent struggle, Martin Luther King and the largely forgotten Albert Schweitzer, from whose Nobel speech Obama probably took his title, "Lasting Peace". But Obama adds Mandela and Marshall to his list of Nobel appointees, as well, and it becomes clear that it is these charac­ters' grand place in history that is making him humble and grateful for being included in such prestigious company, and which is the reason for referring to them. But the string of names also represents the line of ar­gument he pursues in detail through the speech: the humanitarian effort through Schweitzer, the racially significant and nonviolent activist King, the economic development focused Marshall and finally the successful transformer and warrior, Nelson Mandela. Gandhi and nonviolence ap­pear as well. And hidden in the text is also Kennedy's moon speech ("we chose it not because it is easy, but because it's hard!"). It's like a tapestry of fine threads taken from famous speeches of the last century. And it works. Obama and Nobel Obama and his speechwriters seem to have done research on the afore­mentioned Nobel laureates and their speeches. But Obama does not re­fer to the three pillars of Alfred Nobel's testament: enhancing brother­hood among nations, reducing armies and holding peace congresses. He does, however, acknowledge the Prize committee's practice of alternately awarding the prize to humanitarian and peace-related engagements as well as the environmental concerns that have been included in later years, represented by, for example, A1 Gore and Wangari Ma thai. Dynamic and confrontational From the very start Obama confronts his critics head on: "I am the Commander-in-Chief of a nation in the midst of two wars". And he boldly ushers the listener through the reasons his award must be controversial. "These questions are not new" he continues. In addressing the notion of "just war" he is straightforward: "[W]e know that for most of history, this concept of just war was rarely observed." Civilian casualties during the Second World War were as great as the loss of soldiers, he admits. Wars are not glorious. Wars are destructive and dirty. The speech gives us the straightforward speaker, the media-savvy Obama's very trade mark. He is not afraid of defending his actions and position: In sum he says: Let's get the difficult things on the table. We are offered a moment to contemplate: "These questions are not new," he says. There is philosophy. There is history and historical analysis. Those who remembered Obama's monumental speech "A More Perfect Un­ion" (delivered 18 March 2008) may have anticipated a bold rendering of America's past. Maybe he would address the original Indian population that is now living in small reserves, or speak of the long list of dark stories in the history of the US: Chile, Vietnam, Haiti, Panama... The Congo? Hiroshima? A new spirit in the White House is about to announce a new era of honest cooperation built on respect for human rights. All the words are there: peace, prosperity, Gandhi, King, nonviolence, human rights... But what is the message? Obamas plain history lesson "The plain fact is this ..." Obama starts his history lesson on the second page of his eight-page speech: "The US has helped underwrite global security for more than six decades with the blood of our citizens and the strength of our arms." This is what American foreign engagement is all about, according to Obama: underwriting security. And there is more: We have borne this burden not because we seek to impose our will. We have done so out of enlightened self interest - because we seek a better future for our children and grandchildren, and we believe that their lives will be better if other's children and grandchildren can live in freedom and prosperity... America has never fought a war against a democracy, and our closest friends are governments that protect the rights of their citizens. For peace activists and human rights advocates, who commented on the speech later, this would have been the moment to remind the US presi­dent of a history closer to truth; of the well-documented1 role that his country's and its agencies played in bringing down democratically elected regimes; of assassinations or attempted assassinations of foreign heads of state or leaders; of refusals to adhere to international conventions up­holding human rights and justice; of America's meticulously planned use of the atom bomb to annihilate the entirely non-military targets of two huge cities teeming with children, women and elderly people;2 of its sup­ply of arms to some of the most cruel, violent and anti-human rights groups the world has ever seen; of its support for repressive regimes and movements throughout the world. Had there been an iota of regret or sadness in the historical rendering given in the speech, one could have appreciated the president and understood his applauding audience. One could have clung to the possibility that "our good guy" was only being tactical in avoiding self-criticism. But Obama never gives any such life­line to drowning fans. Obamas incredible lightness of empire Obama's seemingly head-on start to his speech, then, is not as bold as it appears at first glance. For he conveniently looks the other way when he could have confronted the really tough questions, the history of conquest and subjugation on the part of the empire he is leading. "I am the com­mander in chief of a country at war," he says, as if implying a "bear with me" and asking us to pity him and see the waging of war as a positive factor when assessing his worthiness as a candidate for the Nobel Prize . He is very much in line with the early American leaders in this. He shares what Charles S. Maier calls the convenient ability of "Americans of European origin... to enjoy the incredible lightness of empire". Maier reminds us of the fact that the true heart of empire is far from noble or benevolent; it is "a heart of darkness" (Maier 2010: 153), a darkness that Obama never recognises in his speech. Darkness in Obama's world is the same as the one you find in Bush's world: it consists of terrorists, under-one-dollar-a-day-poverty and the brutal governments of failed states. Convenient semi-truths. Maier, citing Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper's study Empires in World History, reminds us of the truth that "'[t]error was the hidden face of empire' and it has not always been so hidden, either (Maier 2010: 154). Enjoying the incredible lightness of empire is something Obama shares with the military industrial complex as well as the Washington Consensus family members two blocks up Pennsylvania Avenue from the White House, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Empire seems as controversial as apple pie. But enjoying the lightness of empire is also shared by a large majority of the peoples of industrialised countries, who benefit from the spoils of that same empire. This is Obama's fundamental betrayal of the legacy of Alfred Nobel and Nobel's central aspiration: to disregard empire's true nature and its fundamentally destructive role in its pursuit of profit and power. Yet again we are told that war, death and destruction can bring peace, and thus the sad fact is that Obama puts himself in the company of history’s conquis­tadors, emperors and warmongers who have never ever ceased to con­struct their alleged noble causes in the pursuit of justice, prosperity and peace as a cover for brutal exploitation. It is an ugly bunch that through­out history has launched infinite war to pursue infinite peace. One could not possibly get further away from the essence of Nobel's legacy. What could Obama have done to redeem himself, given the shame­ful legacy of the American empire? Could he like Jeremiah Wright have revisited the facts about the "chickens that have come home to roost"? Could he have addressed the history of wrongs that the future will have to atone for? Could he have painted a future of a different kind, one that replaces the power of the sword and the clenched fist with the power of the word and the open palm? Politics is the pursuit of the possible, and good political speeches are acts that create spaces for action and change. And Obama is the master of this. But no excellent speech writing can gloss over the weakness of a story that is not true to history, which does not recognise the world as it is. Obama committed that sin on 10 December 2009. Historical irony Obama sees himself as the embodiment of Martin Luther King's nonvio­lence strategy: King's "I have a dream" in 1963 becomes tangible reality in President Obama some 50 years later. Not the colour of the skin, but the content of the character, is his message: As someone who stands here as a direct consequence of Dr. King's life work, I am living testimony to the moral force of non-violence. I know there's nothing weak - nothing passive - nothing naive - in the creed and lives of Gandhi and King. But the homage to King and Gandhi is not developed into his argumen­tation. It is picked up, only to be effectively denounced in the following passage: "I face the world as it is, and cannot stand idle in the face of threats to the American people. For make no mistake: Evil does exist in the world." So much for the moral force of nonviolence. It's a figment in the minds of dreamers. It does not belong to Obama's "real world". Just as peaceful means are useless against Hitler’s armies or Al-Qacda: "A non­violent movement could not have halted Hitler's armies. Negotiations cannot convince al Qaeda's leaders to lay down their arms." Forgotten is the power that brought down Ku-Klux-Klan and slavery and the forces that gave hope to millions and put a black man in the White House. It doesn't belong in the real world, as Obama sees it. An ironic incident comes to mind: Martin Luther King, Jr, the "dreamer", met with harsh criticism from his black militant brother Mal­colm X for his nonviolent approach in the 1960. But Malcolm X also commented on the death of Kennedy, as the "chickens coming home to roost" in November 1963. He was echoed in Pastor Jeremiah Wrights attacks on America and the 9/11 attacks 46 years later. Malcolm X was expelled from the Muslim Nation, as was Wright from the Obama camp. You do not go unpunished for challenging America's supremacy. You can represent nonviolence or violent ideologies, as long as you do not chal­lenge people to uncover the dark sides of US history. King was murdered in 1968, on the day that commemorated his first speech against the Viet­nam War. His anti-war stance was said to undermine his security and probably cost him his life in the end. Malcolm X, a self-confessed believer in armed struggle, ridiculcd King's nonviolence as unproductive, naive and a waste of black energy. Both King and Malcolm X were slain at the age of 39. Violent or not, their work was equally dangerous and unacceptable to those in power at the time. To anyone seeking a position in US politics this is evident; and for Obama, expelling Wright was unavoidable, even if the content of Wright’s speech made sense to anyone who acknowledges and tries to understand the US empire.

Imperialist domination empirically outweighs visible war and makes extinction inevitable

Eckhardt 90 (William, Lentz Peace Research Laboratory of St. Louis, JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH, February 1990, p. 15-16)

Modern Western Civilization used war as well as peace to gain the whole world as a domain to benefit itself at the expense of others: The expansion of the culture and institutions of modern civilization from its centers in Europe was made possible by imperialistic war… It is true missionaries and traders had their share in the work of expanding world civilization, but always with the support, immediate or in the background, of armies and navies (pp. 251-252). The importance of dominance as a primary motive in civilized war in general was also emphasized for modern war in particular: '[Dominance] is probably the most important single element in the causation of major modern wars' (p. 85). European empires were thrown up all over the world in this process of benefiting some at the expense of others, which was characterized by armed violence contributing to structural violence: 'World-empire is built by conquest and maintained by force… Empires are primarily organizations of violence' (pp. 965, 969). 'The struggle for empire has greatly increased the disparity between states with respect to the political control of resources, since there can never be enough imperial territory to provide for all' (p. 1190). This 'disparity between states', not to mention the disparity within states, both of which take the form of racial differences in life expectancies, **has killed 15-20 times as many people in the 20th century** as have wars and revolutions (Eckhardt & Kohler, 1980; Eckhardt, 1983c). When this structural violence of 'disparity between states' created by civilization is taken into account, then the violent nature of civilization becomes much more apparent. Wright concluded that 'Probably at least 10 per cent of deaths in modern civilization can be attributed directly or indirectly to war… The trend of war has been toward greater cost, both absolutely and relative to population… The proportion of the population dying as a direct consequence of battle has tended to increase' (pp. 246, 247). So far as structural violence has constituted about one-third of all deaths in the 20th century (Eckhardt & Kohler, 1980; Eckhardt, 1983c), and so far as structural violence was a function of armed violence, past and present, then Wright's estimate was very conservative indeed. Assuming that war is some function of civilization, then civilization is responsible for one-third of 20th century deaths. This is surely self-destruction carried to a high level of efficiency. The structural situation has been improving throughout the 20th century, however, so that structural violence caused 'only' 20% of all deaths in 1980 (Eckhardt, 1983c). There is obviously room for more improvement. To be sure, armed violence in the form of revolution has been directed toward the reduction of structural violence, even as armed violence in the form of imperialism has been directed toward its maintenance. But imperial violence came first**, in the sense of creating structural violence,** before revolutionary violence emerged to reduce it. It is in this sense that structural violence was basically, fundamentally, and primarily a function of armed violence in its imperial form. The atomic age has ushered in the possibility, and some would say the probability, of killing not only some of us for the benefit of others, nor even of killing all of us to no one's benefit, but of putting an end to life itself! This is surely carrying self-destruction to some infinite power beyond all human comprehension. It's too much, or superfluous, as the Existentialists might say. Why we should care is a mystery. But, if we do, then the need for civilized peoples to respond to the ethical challenge is very urgent indeed. Life itself may depend upon our choice.

Vote negative to question the epistemological foundations of empire. US neo-imperialism sustains itself by controlling the boundaries of knowledge. Only exposing the epistemic violence of imperialism and addressing the needs of the oppressed can solve.

McLaren and Kincheloe in 5 (Peter Professor of Education, Graduate School of Education and Information Studies @ UCLA and Joe, professor and Canada Research Chair at the Faculty of Education, McGill University in Montreal, Quebec, Canada. The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research, Third Edition, Eds Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln)

In this context, it is important to note that we understand a social theory as a map or a guide to the social sphere. In a research context, it does not determine how we see the world but helps us devise questions and strategies for exploring it. A critical social theory is concerned in particular with issues of power and justice and the ways that the economy; matters of race, class, and gender; ideologies; discourses; education; religion and other social institutions; and cultural dynamics interact to construct a social system (Beck-Gernsheim, Butler, & Puigvert, 2003; Flccha, Gomez, & Puigvert, 2003). Thus, in this context we seek to provide a view of an evolving criticality or a reconceptualized critical theory. Critical theory is never static; it is always evolving, changing in light of both new theoretical insights and new problems and social circumstances. The list of concepts elucidating our articulation of critical theory indicates a criticality informed by a variety of discourses emerging after the work of the Frankfurt School Indeed, some of the theoretical discourses, while referring to themselves as critical, directly call into question some of the work of Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse. Thus, diverse theoretical traditions have informed our understanding of criticality and have demanded understanding of diverse forms of oppression including class, race, gender, sexual, cultural, religious, colonial, and ability-related concerns. The evolving notion of criticality we present is informed by, while critiquing, the post-discourses—for example, postmodernism, poststructuralism, and postcolonialism. In this context, critical theorists become detectives of new theoretical insights, perpetually searching for new and interconnected ways of understanding power and oppression and the ways they shape everyday life and human experience. In this context, criticality and the research it supports are always evolving, always encountering new ways to irritate dominant forms of power, to provide more evocative and compelling insights. Operating in this way, an evolving criticality is always vulnerable to exclusion from the domain of approved modes of research. The forms of social change it supports always position it in some places as an outsider, an awkward detective always interested in uncovering social structures, discourses, ideologies, and epistemologies that prop up both the status quo and a variety of forms of privilege. In the epistemological domain, white, male, class elitist, heterosexist, imperial, and colonial privilege often operates by asserting the power to claim objectivity and neutrality. Indeed, the owners of such privilege often own the "franchise" on reason and rationality. Proponents of an evolving criticality possess a variety of tools to expose such oppressive power politics. Such proponents assert that critical theory is well-served by drawing upon numerous liberatory discourses and including diverse groups of marginalized peoples and their allies in the nonhierarchical aggregation of critical analysts {Bello, 2003; Clark, 2002; Humphries, 1997). In the present era, emerging forms of neocolonialism and neo-imperialism in the United States move critical theorists to examine the wavs American power operates under the cover of establishing democracies all over the world. Advocates of an evolving criticality argue—as we do in more detail later in this chapter—that such neocolonial power must be exposed so it can be opposed in the United States and around the world. The American Empires justification in the name of freedom for undermining democratically elected governments from Iran (Kincheloe, 2004), Chile, Nicaragua, and Venezuela to Liberia (when its real purpose is to acquire geopolitical advantage for future military assaults, economic leverage in international markets, and access to natural resources) must be exposed by critical-ists for what it is—a rank imperialist sham (McLaren, 2003a, 2003b; McLaren & Jaramillo, 2002; McLaren & Martin, 2003). Critical researchers need to view their work in the context of living and working in a nation-state with the most powerful military-industrial complex in history that is shamefully using the terrorist attacks of September 11 to advance a ruthless imperialist agenda fueled by capitalist accumulation by means of the rule of force (McLaren & Farahmandpur,2003). Chomsky (2003), for instance, has accused the U.S. government of the "supreme crime" of preventive war (in the case of its invasion of Iraq, the use of military force to destroy an invented or imagined threat) of the type that was condemned at Kuremburg. Others, like historian Arthur Schlesinger (cited in Chomsky, 2003), have likened the invasion of Iraq to Japan's "day of infamy'' that is, to the policy that imperial Japan employed at the time of Pearl Harbor. David G. Smith (2003) argues that such imperial dynamics are supported by particular epistemological forms. The United States is an epistemological empire based on a notion of truth that undermines the knowledges produced by those outside the good graces and benevolent authority of the empire. Thus, in the 21 st century, critical theorists must develop sophisticated ways to address not only the brute material relations of class rule linked to the mode and relations of capitalist production and imperialist conquest (whether through direct military intervention or indirectly through the creation of client states) but also the epistemological violence that helps discipline the world Smith refers to this violence as a form of "information warfare" that spreads deliberate falsehoods about countries such as Iraq and Iran. U.S. corporate and governmental agents become more sophisticated in the use of such episto-weaponry with every day that passes. Obviously, an evolving criticality does not promiscuously choose theoretical discourses to add to the bricolage of critical theories. It is highly suspicious—as we detail later—of theories that fail to understand the malevolent workings of power, that fail to critique the blinders of Eurocentrism, that cultivate an elitism of insiders and outsiders, and that fail to discern a global system of inequity supported by diverse forms of ideology and violence. It is uninterested in any theory—no matter how fashionable—that does not directly address the needs of victims of oppression and the suffering they must endure. The following is an elastic, ever-evolving set of concepts included in our evolving notion of criticality. With theoretical innovations and shifting Zeitgeists, they evolve. The points that are deemed most important in one time period pale in relation to different points in a new era. <P306-307>

# Case

#### Speaking for others requires investigating one’s historical position of privilege – retreating from representing others only excuses us from accountability for that privilege.

**Spivak 1990** [Gayatri, Prof of English at Columbia, *The Post-Colonial Critic*, p.62-3]

It is a problem that is very close to my heart because I teach, after all, abroad. I will have in an undergraduate class, **let's say, a young, white male student**, politically-correct, who **will say: "I am only a bourgeois white male, I can't speak.**" In that situation-it's peculiar, because I am in the position of power and their teacher and, on the other hand, I am not a bourgeois white male-**I say to them: "Why not develop a certain degree of rage against the history that has written such an abject script for you that you are silenced?" Then you** begin to **investigate what it is that silences you, rather than take this very deterministic position -- since my skin colour is this, since my sex is this, I cannot speak.** I call these things, as you know, somewhat derisively, chromatism: basing everything on skin color-"I am white, I can't speak"-and genitalism: depending on what kind of genitals you have, you can or cannot speak in certain situations. From this position, then, I say **you will of course not speak in the same way about the Third World material, but if you make it your task not only to learn what is going on there through** language, through specific programmes of **study, but also at the same time through a historical critique of your position as the investigating person, then you will see that you have earned the right to criticize, and you be heard.** When you take the position of not doing your homework "I will not criticize because of my accident of birth, the historical accident" -that is a much more pernicious position. In one way you take a risk to criticize, of criticizing something which is Other-something which you used to dominate. I say that **you have to take a certain risk: to say "I won't criticize" is salving your conscience, and allowing you not to do any homework.** On the other hand**, if you criticize having earned the right to do so, then you are indeed taking a risk and you will probably be made welcome, and can hope to be judged with respect.**

**Moreover, speaking for the Third world masks imperialism and legitimates the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of people.**

Linda **Alcoff**, Professor of Philosophy, Women's Studies and Political Science, Director of Women’s Studies, Syracuse University, **1995**, Linda Martin-Alcoff, “The Problem of Speaking for Others,” http://www.alcoff.com/content/speaothers.html.

**This shows us why it is so important to reconceptualize discourse, as Foucault recommends, as an event, which includes speaker, words, hearers, location, language, and so on. All such evaluations produced in this way will be of necessity indexed. That is, they will obtain for a very specific location and cannot be taken as universal. This simply follows from the fact that the evaluations will be based on the specific elements of historical discursive context, location of speakers and hearers, and so forth. When any of these elements is changed, a new evaluation is called for. Our ability to assess the effects of a given discursive event is limited; our ability to predict these effects is even more difficult. When meaning is plural and deferred, we can never hope to know the totality of effects. Still, we can know some of the effects our speech generates: I can find out, for example, that the people I spoke for are angry that I did so or appreciative. By learning as much as possible about the context of reception I can increase my ability to discern at least some of the possible effects. This mandates incorporating a more dialogic approach to speaking, that would include learning from and about the domains of discourse my words will affect. I want to illustrate the implications of this fourth point by applying it to the examples I gave at the beginning. In the case of Anne Cameron, if the effects of her books are truly disempowering for Native women, they are counterproductive to Cameron's own stated intentions, and she should indeed "move over." In the case of the white male theorist who discussed architecture instead of the politics of postmodernism, the effect of his refusal was that he offered no contribution to an important issue and all of us there lost an opportunity to discuss and explore it. Now let me turn to the example of George Bush. When Bush claimed that Noriega is a corrupt dictator who stands in the way of democracy in Panama, he repeated a claim which has been made almost word for word by the Opposition movement in Panama. Yet the effects of the two statements are vastly different because the meaning of the claim changes radically depending on who states it. When the president of the United States stands before the world passing judgement on a Third World government, and criticizing it on the basis of corruption and a lack of democracy, the immediate effect of this statement, as opposed to the Opposition's, is to reenforce the prominent Anglo view that Latin American corruption is the primary cause of the region's poverty and lack of democracy, that the U.S. is on the side of democracy in the region, and that the U.S. opposes corruption and tyranny. Thus, the effect of a U.S. president's speaking for Latin America in this way is to re-consolidate U.S. imperialism by obscuring its true role in the region in torturing and murdering hundreds and thousands of people who have tried to bring democratic and progressive governments into existence.**

**The affirmative is a perfect erasure of the other; they craft an image of the other in terms of their own systems of knowledge. This image inevitably overwhelms the other and denies them any sort of individual subjectivity.**

Linda **Alcoff,** Professor of Philosophy, Women's Studies and Political Science, Director of Women’s Studies, Syracuse University, **1995,** Linda Martin-Alcoff, “The Problem of Speaking for Others,” <http://www.alcoff.com/content/speaothers.html>**.**

**This is** partly the case because of **what has been called the "crisis of representation."** For **in both the practice of speaking for as well as the practice of speaking about others, I am engaging in the act of representing the other's needs, goals, situation, and in fact, who they are, based on my own situated interpretation.** In post-structuralist terms**, I am participating in the construction of their subject-positions rather than simply discovering their true selves. Once we pose it as a problem of representation, we see that, not only are speaking for and speaking about analytically close, so too are the practices of speaking for others and speaking for myself.** For, in speaking for myself, I am also representing my self in a certain way, as occupying a specific subject-position, having certain characteristics and not others, and so on. **In speaking** for myself, **I (momentarily) create my self---just as much as when I speak for others I create them as a public, discursive self, a self which is more unified than any subjective experience can support. And this public self will in most cases have an effect on the self experienced as interiority.** The point here is that **the problem of representation underlies all cases of speaking for,** whether I am speaking for myself or for others**. This is not to suggest that all representations are fictions: they have very real material effects, as well as material origins, but they are always mediated in complex ways by discourse, power, and location.** However,the problem of speaking for others is more specific than the problem of representation generally,and requires its own particular analysis. There is one final point I want to make before we can pursue this analysis. The way I have articulated this problem may imply that individuals make conscious choices about their discursive practice free of ideology and the constraints of material reality. This is not what I wish to imply. The problem of speaking for others is a social one, the options available to us are socially constructed, and the practices we engage in cannot be understood as simply the results of autonomous individual choice. Yet to replace both "I" and "we" with a passive voice that erases agency results in an erasure of responsibility and accountability for one's speech, an erasure I would strenuously argue against (there is too little responsibility-taking already in Western practice!). When we sit down to write, or get up to speak, we experience ourselves as making choices. We may experience hesitation from fear of being criticized or from fear of exacerbating a problem we would like to remedy, or we may experience a resolve to speak despite existing obstacles, but in many cases we experience having the possibility to speak or not to speak. On the one hand, a theory which explains this experience as involving autonomous choices free of material structures would be false and ideological, but on the other hand, if we do not acknowledge the activity of choice and the experience of individual doubt, we are denying a reality of our experiential lives.[9](http://www.alcoff.com/content/speaothers.html#footnote9)

#### The erasure of the other constitutes a form of spiritual genocide which represents the destruction of human dignity – it outweighs the aff.

**Williams 1987** (PATRICIA WILLIAMS, Associate Professor of Law, The City University of New York Law School at Queens College, University of Miami Law Review, 42 U. Miami L. Rev. 127, September)

There are certain societies that define the limits of life and death very differently than our own. For example, **death may occur long before the body ceases to function**, and under the proper circumstances, life may continue for some time after the body is carried to its grave. n71 **These** non-body-bound, uncompartmentalized **ideas recognize the power of spirit, or what we** in our secularized **society might describe as the dynamism of self as reinterpreted by the perceptions of**  [\*151] **other.** n72 These ideas comprehend the fact that **a part of ourselves is beyond the control of pure physical will** and resides in the sanctuary of those around us. **A** **fundamental part of ourselves and of our dignity is dependent upon the uncontrollable, powerful, external observers who constitute society.** n73 **Surely a part of socialization ought to include a sense of caring responsibility for the images of others that are reposited within us**. n74 Taking the example of the man who was stabbed thirty-nine times out of the context of our compartmentalized legal system, and considering it in the hypothetical framework of a legal system that encompasses and recognizes morality, religion, and psychology, **I am moved to see this act as not merely body murder but spirit-murder as well. I see it as spirit-murder, only one of whose manifestations is racism -- cultural obliteration,** prostitution, abandonment of the elderly **and** the homeless, and **genocide** are some of its other guises. **I see spirit-murder as no less than the equivalent of body murder**. One of the reasons that I fear what I call **spirit-murder, or disregard for others** whose lives qualitatively depend on our regard, **is that its product is a system of formalized distortions of thought. It produces social structures centered around fear and hate; it provides a** [\*152] **tumorous outlet for feelings elsewhere unexpressed** . n75 For example, when Bernhard Goetz shot four black teenagers in a New York City subway, an acquaintance of mine said that she could understand his fear because it is a "fact" that blacks commit most crimes. What impressed me, beyond the factual inaccuracy of this statement, n76 was the reduction of Goetz' crime to "his fear," which I translate to mean her fear. The four teenage victims became all blacks everywhere, and "most crimes" clearly meant that most blacks commit crimes. In the process of devaluing its image of black people, the general white population seems to have been socialized to blind itself to the horrors inflicted by white people. One of the clearest examples of the mechanics of this socialized blindness is the degree to which the public and the media in New York repeatedly and relentlessly bestialized Goetz' victims. Images of the urban jungle, of young black men filling the role of "wild animals," were favorite journalistic constructions. Young white urban professionals were mythologized, usually wrapped in the rhetorical apparel of lambs or sheep, as the tender, toothsome prey. n77 The corollary to such imagery is that the fate of those domesticated white innocents is to be slaughtered in confrontation, the dimensions of which thus become meaninglessly and tragically sacrificial. n78 **Locked into such a reification, no act of the sheep against the wolves can ever be seen as violent in its own right, because active sheep are so inherently uncharacteristic, so brave, so irresistibly and triumphantly parabolic.** Thus, when prosecutor Gregory Waples cast Goetz as a "hunter" in his final summation, juror Michael Axelrod  [\*153]  said that Waples "was insulting my intelligence. There was nothing to justify that sort of [characterization]. Goetz wasn't a hunter." n79 Furthermore, most white people do not seem to feel as criminal the dehumanizing cultural images of sterile, mindless white womanhood and expressionless, bored but righteous, assembly line white manhood. n80 For example, although it is difficult to document in any scientific way, I think many whites do not expect other whites to rape, rob, or kill them. n81 They are surprised when it happens. Perhaps they blind themselves to the warning signals of approaching assault. Some do not even recognize it when it does happen; they apologize for the assailant, think it must have been their fault; they misperceived the other's intent. n82 [SHE CONTINUES] If Americans are subject to such utter emotional devastation, it is no wonder that the urge to act as a victimizer is so irresistible; it  [\*155]  appears to be the only right thing, the only defensible thing to do. It is no wonder that society has created in blacks a class of ready-made, prepackaged victims. To discount as much violence as we do in this society must mean that we have a very angry population suppressing explosive rage. Most white Americans, at least those in urban areas, have seen the angry, muttering "lunatic" black person who beats the air with his fists and curses aloud. Most people cross the street to avoid him; they don't choose him to satisfy their need to know the time of day. Yet for generations, and particularly in the wake of the foaming public response to incidents like Howard Beach, the Goetz shooting, n87 and Forsythe County, that is precisely how white America has looked to many black Americans. For these reasons, I think **we need to elevate what I call spirit-murder to the conceptual, if not punitive level of a capital moral offense**. n88 **We need to see it as a cultural cancer; we need to open our eyes to the spiritual genocide it is wreaking on blacks, whites, and the abandoned and abused of all races and ages. We need to eradicate its numbing pathology before it wipes out what precious little humanity we have left.**

# 2nc

1. **The critique outweighs and turns the case – this is all our Eckhardt 90 evidence.**
	1. **Magnitude – 20 times as many people die from structural violence caused by imperialism as from visible acts of war itself. That includes not only us invterventionism in mexico, but us treatment of the me, etc. There is no real explanation of how they can deal with us imperialism as a whole, only how they can deal with border issues.**
	2. **Critique turns the case because there’s never enough imperial territory for everyone. That makes violence inevitable, the alt solves the root cause while they merely apply a band-aid. Imperialism doesn’t spring from a single issue. They aren’t going to win a racism root cause debate here. Imperialism springs from capitalism, gender, race, and the overwhelming need for power. Only questioning ALL of those issues can lead to real, substantive change.**
	3. **Alt solves the aff – questioning US imperialism gets to the root of why we securitize our borders and criminialize immigrants.**
2. **Imperialism destroys value to life by breaking down society psychologically and colonizing the mind**

**Thiong’o 86** (Ngugi wa Thiong’o – Distinguished Professor of University of California, Irvine. “Decolonising the Mind: The Politics of Language in African Literature”. 1986.)

The oppressed and the exploited of the earth maintain their defiance: liberty from theft. But the biggest weapon wielded and actually daily unleashed by imperialism against that collective defiance is the cultural bomb. The effect of a cultural bomb is to annihilate a people’s belief in their names, in their languages, in their environment, in their heritage of struggle, in their unity, in their capacities and ultimately in themselves. It makes them see their past as one wasteland of non-achievement and it makes them want to distance themselves from that wasteland. It makes them want to identify with that which is furthest removed from themselves; for instance, with other peoples’ languages rather than their own. It makes them identify with that which is decadent and reactionary, all those forces which would stop their own springs of life. It even plants serious doubts about the moral rightness of struggle. Possibilities of triumph or victory are seen as remote, ridiculous dreams. **The intended results are** despair, despondency and **a collective death-wish**. Amidst this wasteland which it has created, imperialism presents itself as the cure and demands that the dependant sing hymns of praise with the constant refrain: ‘Theft is holy’. Indeed, this refrain sums up the new creed of the neo-colonial bourgeoisie in many ‘independent’ African states.

The myth of the American frontier valorizes death and atrocity – this makes savage war an act of American heroism and drives the United States to the extremes of total obliteration

**Slotkin 85** [Richard Slotkin, Olin Professor of American Studies @ Wesleyan, The Fatal Environment, p. 60-61]

This ideology of savage war has become an essential trope of our mythologization of history, a cliché of political discourse especially in wartime. In the 1890s imperialists like Theodore Roosevelt rationalized draconian military measures against the Filipinos by comparing them to Apaches. Samuel Eliot Morison, in his multivolume history of naval operations in the Second World War, recounts the posting of this slogan at fleet headquarters in the South Pacific: “KILL JAPS, KILL JAPS, KILL MORE JAPS!” Suspecting that peacetime readers may find the sentiment unacceptably extreme, Morison offers the following rationale; This may shock you, reader; but it is exactly how we felt. We were fighting no civilized, knightly war . . . We were back to primitive days of fighting Indians on the American frontier; no holds barred and no quarter. The Japs wanted it that way, thought they could thus terrify an “effete democracy”; and that is what they got, with the additional horrors of war that modern science can produce.17 It is possible that the last sentence is an oblique reference to the use of the atomic bomb at the war’s end. But aside from that, Morison seems actually to overstate the extraordinary character of the counterviolence against the Japanese (we did, after all, grant quarter) in order to rationalize the strength of his sentiments. Note too the dramatization of the conflict as a vindication of our cultural masculinity against the accusations of “effeteness.” The trope of savage war thus enriches the symbolic meaning of specific acts of war, transforming them into episodes of character building, moral vindication, and regeneration. At the same time it provides advance justification for a pressing of the war to the extreme point of extermination, “war without quarter”: and it puts the moral responsibility for that outcome on the enemy, which is to say, on its predicted victims. As we analyze the structure and meaning of this mythology of violence, it is important that we keep in mind the distinction between the myth and the real-world situations and practices to which it refers. Mythology reproduces the world with its significances heightened beyond normal measure, so that the smallest actions are heavy with cosmic significances, and every conflict appears to press toward ultimate fatalities and final solutions. The American mythology of violence continually invokes the prospect of genocidal warfare and apocalyptic, world-destroying massacres; and there is enough violence in the history of the Indian wars, the slave trade, the labor/management strife of industrialization, the crimes and riots of our chaotic urbanization, and our wars against nationalist and Communist insurgencies in Asia and Latin America to justify many critics in the belief that America is an exceptionally violence society.

The myth of America’s colonial frontier generates institutional, political and interpersonal violence

Gathii 2k

(James Thuo. Associate Dean for Research and Scholarship; Governor George E. Pataki Professor of International Commercial Law. Neoliberalism, Colonialism and International Governance: Decentering the International Law of Governmental Legitimacy. Michigan Law Review, Vol. 98, No. 6, 2000 Survey of Books Related to the Law, pp. 1996-2055. The Michigan Law Review Association.)

In my view, colonialism, like liberal democracy and free markets, is in one way or another embodied in the institutional, polemic, and political projects of which the various rules of international law are part. Here, I differ from Roth, who sees colonialism as an exceptional case of illegitimacy. Instead of understanding colonialism as extinct or even exceptional, I argue that debates on legitimacy cannot be seen outside the dynamics of identity, power, wealth, and inequality at the international level. Colonialism has signified and continues to signify the manner in which ideologies based on racial and cultural differences legitimated expropriation, conquest, conversion, and outcomes such as Slavery Governmental Illegitimacy does not fall into nineteenth-century racism and in fact criticizes liberal internationalists for embracing a view of democracy that is liberal and Western in its outlook in a pluralistic society of nations. Yet, this celebration of pluralism could be broader. First, it could be mobilized to delegitimize the uncritical liberal ambition that is shared even in non-Western societies, to the effect of establishing that people are necessarily the repositories of governmental power without a concurrent examination of the quality of governance. Second, and more importantly for this part of the Review, Roth's analysis could have argued that pretensions of universality in the norms of international law have historically been promoted by colonizing and dominant countries. This universalism presupposes that there are primitive societies that fall below the so-called great civilizations of the West. International law has deployed cultural and racial stereotypes in delegitimating societies outside the West because they fell below conceptions of the state whose standards are naturally and necessarily assumed to be those of the so-called great Western civilizations. In other words, Roth's acknowledgement of pluralism in international society does not extend to acknowledging that non-Western societies can legitimately organize their own societies on the basis of their own civic and political virtue - without any interpretation of their legitimacy by outsiders. Roth acknowledges cultural pluralism, but this cannot be equated with the ethical pluralism that flows from the various cultures of the world. While these cultures are not self-contained, Roth simply wants to predicate legitimacy of governments on a Western state denominator - effective control of the population.

## Structural opression

**Singular outbursts of violence only occur in the context of structural oppression**

Žižek 2008[Slavoj, senior researcher at the Institute of Sociology @ Univ. of Ljubljana, Violence, p. 1-2]

If there is a unifying thesis that runs through the bric-a-brac of reflections on violence that follow, it is that a similar paradox holds true for violence. At the forefront of our minds, the obvious signals of violence are acts of crime and terror, civil unrest, international conflict. But we should learn to step back, to disentangle ourselves from the fascinating lure of this directly visible "subjective" violence, violence performed by a clearly identifiable agent. We need to perceive the contours of the background which generates such outbursts. A step back enables us to identify a violence that sustains our very efforts to fight violence and to promote tolerance. This is the starting point, perhaps even the axiom, of the present book: subjective violence is just the most visible portion of a triumvirate that also includes two objective kinds of violence. First, there is a "symbolic" violence embodied in language and its forms, what Heidegger would call "our house of being." As we shall see later, this violence is not only at work in the obvious-and extensively studied-cases of incitement and of the relations of social domination reproduced in our habitual speech forms: there is a more fundamental form of violence still that pertains to language as such, to its imposition of a certain universe of meaning. Second, there is what I call "systemic" violence, or the often catastrophic consequences of the smooth functioning of our economic and political systems. The catch is that subjective and objective violence cannot be perceived from the same standpoint: subjective violence is experienced as such against the background of a non-violent zero level. It is seen as a perturbation of the "normal," peaceful state of things. However, objective violence is precisely the violence inherent to this "normal" state of things. Objective violence is invisible since it sustains the very zero-level standard against which we perceive something as subjectively violent. Systemic violence is thus something like the notorious "dark matter" of physics, the counterpart to an all-too visible subjective violence. It may be invisible, but it has to be taken into account if one is to make sense of what otherwise seem to be "irrational" explosions of subjective violence.

## New colonial

. Extend McLaren and Kincheloe in 5 – epistemological questioning allows political agents to fracture the dominant narratives that justify universal violence, solving the K.

2. No offense – Alternative does not need to enact legislation. Risk that the plan causes more violence is greater than a solvency deficit.

3. Refusing their power politics opens the space necessary for dissent and difference

Burke**,** School of Political Science and International Studies, University of Queensland, 2002 Anthony, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 27.1 page InfoTrac OneFile

It is perhaps easy to become despondent, but as countless struggles for freedom, justice, and social transformation have proved, a sense of seriousness can be tempered with the knowledge that many tools are already available--and where they are not, the effort to create a productive new critical sensibility is well advanced. There is also a crucial political opening within the liberal problematic itself, in the sense that it assumes that power is most effective when it is absorbed as truth, consented to and desired--which creates an important space for refusal. As Colin Gordon argues, Foucault thought that the very possibility of governing was conditional on it being credible to the governed as well as the governing. (60) This throws weight onto the question of how security works as a technology of subjectivity. It is to take up Foucault's challenge, framed as a reversal of the liberal progressive movement of being we have seen in Hegel, not to discover who or what we are so much as to refuse what we are. (61 ) Just as security rules subjectivity as both a totalizing and individualizing blackmail and promise, it is at these levels that we can intervene. We can critique the machinic frameworks of possibility represented by law, policy, economic regulation, and diplomacy, while challenging the way these institutions deploy language to draw individual subjects into their consensual web.This suggests, at least provisionally, a dual strategy. The first asserts the space for agency, both in challenging available possibilities for being and their larger socioeconomic implications. Roland Bleiker formulates an idea of agency that shifts away from the lone (male) hero overthrowing the social order in a decisive act of rebellion to one that understands both the thickness of social power and its "fissures," "fragmentation," and "thinness." We must, he says, "observe how an individual may be able to escape the discursive order and influence its shifting boundaries.... By doing so, discursive terrains of dissent all of a sudden appear where forces of domination previously seemed invincible." (62)Pushing beyond security /requires tactics that can work at many levels--that empower individuals to recognize the larger social, cultural, and economic implications of the everyday forms of desire, subjection, and discipline they encounter, to challenge and rewrite them, and that in turn contribute to collective efforts to transform the larger structures of being, exchange, and power that sustain (and have been sustained by) these forms. As Derrida suggests, this is to open up aporetic possibilities that transgress and call into question the boundaries of the self, society, and the international that security seeks to imagine and police.The second seeks new ethical principles based on a critique of the rigid and repressive forms of identity that security has heretofore offered. Thus writers such as Rosalyn Diprose, William Conolly, and Moira Gatens have sought to imagine a new ethical relationship that thinks difference not on the basis of the same but on the basis of a dialogue with the other that might allow space for the unknown and unfamiliar, for a "debate and engagement with the other's law and the other's ethics"--an encounter that involves a transformation of the self rather than the other. (63) Thus while the sweep and power of security must be acknowledged, it must also be **refused**: at the simultaneous levels of individual identity, social order, and macroeconomic possibility, it would entail another kind of work on "ourselves"--a **political refusal** of the One, the imagination of an other that never returns to the same. It would be to ask if there is a world after security, and what its shimmering possibilities might be.

## FW

1. Our interpretation is that the role of the ballot is to question the epistemological foundations of empire. The plan doesn’t occur but the logic that supports knowledge-production within debate does. This is best

A. Ground –They should defend the entirety of the 1AC, not just select parts. It’s a question of the plan action as well as the advantages and epistemology that justifies it. The neg burden is only to prove that voting aff is undesirable.

B. Education – Imperialism critques radically transform our understanding of what it means to be political. Education cannot be reduced to mere policy action, it requires a direct understanding of the people laws are meant to target.

C. Predictability – They chose the 1AC. Links prove predictability, and any arbitrary interpretation about what we can and cannot defend is the most unpredictable.

1. **Prefer education to fairness: rules are created to re-enforce status quo power and privilege**

Delgado 92 (Law Prof at U. of Colorado, 1992 [Richard, “Shadowboxing: An Essay On Power,” In Cornell Law Review, May)

The debate on objective and subjective standards touches on these issues of world-making and the social construction of reality. Powerful actors, such as tobacco companies and male dates, want objective standards applied to them simply because these standards always, and already, reflect them and their culture. These actors have been in power; their subjectivity long ago was deemed "objective" and imposed on the world. n36 Now their ideas about meaning, action, and fairness are built into our culture, into our view of malefemale, doctor-patient, and manufacturer-consumer relations. It is no surprise, then, that judgment under an "objective" (or reasonable person) standard generally will favor the stronger party. This, however, is not always the case: Rules that too predictably and reliably favored the strong would be declared unprincipled. The stronger actor must be able to see his favorite principles as fair and [\*819] just -- ones that a reasonable society would rely upon in contested situations. n39 He must be able to depict the current standards as integral to justice, freedom, fairness, and administrability -- to everything short of the American Way itself (and maybe even that, since societies that regulate these relationships more closely are paternalistic, and verge on (shhh!) socialism).

1. **Understanding the oppression of imperialism is key for scholarly discussions**

Sachs ’03 [Aaron Sachs, “The Ultimate "Other": Post-Colonialism and Alexander Von Humboldt's Ecological Relationship with Nature”, History and Theory, December 2003, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3590683>]

There is no denying the value of the post-colonial critique and its relevance to all studies of travel and the environment. Post-colonialism, at its best, means recuperating the objects of the traveler's gaze. In a world so profoundly shaped-damaged, I would argue-by colonialism and imperialism, it is imperative that scholars focus on celebrating the colonized, on hearing the voices of "others." We must understand all the ways in which Western civilization has come to depend directly on forms of domination. Indeed, it makes perfect sense, as David Spurr has noted in The Rhetoric of Empire (1993), that "works once studied primarily as expressions of traditionally Western ideals are now also read as evidence of the manner in which such ideals have served in the historical process of colonization."16

## Perm

1. **Group the perms – they don’t get them, this is a debate about epistemology, their assumptions about the world are an intrinsic part of the 1AC, means any perm is severance which makes the aff a moving target and is a voter.**
2. **Perms can’t solve – that’s our** McLaren and Kincheloe 5 alt evidence. Any ideology which does not directly address the needs of the oppressed will be co-opted by government and corporate agents as part of their epistemic weaponry.
3. **Even if the aff is net-less imperialistic, it only serves to prop up a broken system. It’s no better than an alcoholic swearing off dark liquor.**
4. Don’t buy the link turn – it is a mystification tactic for public support to policy action

Falk in 2005 (Richard A. Falk “Demystifying Iraq?” CR: The New Centennial Review. Vol 5, Num 1. Pp 43-62. Spring 2005) Falk is a professor emeritus of International Law at Princeton University.

There are sophisticated arguments abroad in the land at this time that look upon mystiﬁcation as a necessary and natural prerogative of all political leaders, including the wisest and most virtuous. These ideological arguments are often associated with political theories of leadership that draw sharp distinctions between the masses, who are supposedly unable to comprehend the subtleties and hidden nuances of benevolent governance, and elites, who are entrusted with the awesome responsibility of rulership that can only be fulﬁlled by reliance on special qualities of understanding and insight that concern truths and policy objectives too inﬂammatory to acknowledge. Especially in a democratically constituted society, the mobilization of support depends on ﬁnding a rationale for a preferred course of policy that the citizenry will accept, whether true or false. Another approach is to create the conditions via inculcated misperception that make what was previously unacceptable as a public rationale become acceptable. I believe that such a pattern of mystiﬁcation bears centrally on all aspects of the American approach to the Iraq War, including the pre-war buildup of support and the post-battleﬁeld occupation of that tormented country, and that, somewhat paradoxically, the dynamic of this war will remain incomprehensible without the oddly clarifying impact of mystiﬁcation. It should be evident that mystiﬁcation is something deeper and more sinister than putting the best face on a course of action that any government does to the extent possible, or hiring spin-doctors to give a controversial and unsuccessful ofﬁcial policy its maximum possible public appeal.

1. **The perm is just a tool to trick the public into believing real reforms are being made. This is especially harmful in academic contexts because of past co-option and proves the need for a rethinking by itself.**

Kennedy and Lucas in 5 (Liam and Scott, Dir. of the Clinton Institute for American Studies and dir. Of Center for US foreign policy, American Quarterly, Enduring Freedom: Public Diplomacy and U.S. Foreign Policy, 57(2), p. 310-311)

“Public diplomacy—which consists of systematic efforts to communicate not with foreign governments but with the people themselves—has a central role to play in the task of making the world safer for the just interests of the United States, its citizens, and its allies.”5 In the last few years, U.S. public diplomacy has undergone intensive reorganization and retooling as it takes on a more prominent propaganda role in the efforts to win the “hearts and minds” of foreign publics. This is not a new role, for the emergent ideas and activities of public diplomacy as the “soft power” wing of American foreign policy have notable historical prefigurations in U.S. international relations. In this essay we situate the history of the cold war paradigm of U.S. public diplomacy within the broader framework of “political warfare” that combines overt and covert forms of information management.6 However, there are distinctive features to the “new public diplomacy” within both domestic and international contexts of the contemporary American imperium. It operates in a conflicted space of power and value that is a crucial theater of strategic operations for the renewal of American hegemony within a transformed global order. We consider the relation of this new diplomacy to the broader pursuit of political warfare by the state in its efforts to transform material preponderance (in terms of financial, military, and information capital) into effective political outcomes across the globe. In a post-9/11 context, we argue, public diplomacy functions not simply as a tool of national security, but also as a component of U.S. efforts to manage the emerging formation of a neoliberal empire. The term “public diplomacy” was coined by academics at Tufts University in the mid-1960s to “describe the whole range of communications, information, and propaganda” under control of the U.S. government.7 As the term came into vogue, it effectively glossed (through the implication of both “public” and diplomatic intent) the political valence of both its invention and object of study through emphasis on its role as “an applied transnational science of human behaviour.”8 The origin of the term is a valuable reminder that academic knowledge production has itself been caught up in the historical foundations and contemporary conduct of U.S. public diplomacy, with the American university a long-established laboratory for the study of public opinion and of cross-cultural knowledge in service of the state.9 American studies, of course, has had a particularly dramatic entanglement with public diplomacy and the cold war contest for “hearts and minds,” and legacies of that entanglement still haunt the field imaginary today.10 We do not intend to directly revisit that history here, but we do contend that the current regeneration of public diplomacy by the U.S. government is an important topic for critical study by American studies scholars, in particular as they negotiate the “internationalization” of their field in the context of post- and transnational impulses, now conditioned by the new configurations of U.S. imperialism. In this essay we posit a need to retheorize the modes and meanings of public diplomacy in order to reconsider the ways in which the power of the American state is manifested in its operations beyond its national borders, and to examine the conditions of knowledge-formation and critical thinking shaped by the operations of this power. At issue is not so much the way in which American studies has been shaped internationally through diplomatic patronage (though this remains an important and underexamined issue) but rather the articulation of field identities in the expanding networks of international and transnational political cultures.

# 1NR

# 1nr

#### Falcon 8

In this article, the author proposes a confluence of W. E. B. Du Bois’s “double consciousness”

(1903/1982) and Gloria Anzaldúa’s “mestiza consciousness” (1989) to analyze the

experiences of three Afro-Peruvian women. The merging of double and mestiza consciousness

is necessary to holistically understand how gendered racism shapes their lives and why they

have a desire to forge transnational solidarity with other women in the African Diaspora of

the Americas. By gendering double consciousness and expanding mestiza consciousness

beyond the United States and the U.S.-Mexico borderlands, we can better understand how

women’s agency plays a role in what the author refers to as mestiza double consciousness.

#### The same thing

Perez 4’ <https://muse.jhu.edu/journals/nwsa_journal/v017/17.2perez.html>

I wasn't aware of how profoundly important *nepantla*, that in between space, was to her way of seeing until I took a walk with her on the beach in Santa Cruz. I can't remember exactly the year; I just know that I was in San Francisco and drove to Santa Cruz to spend time with her. It was early evening and she asked me if I wanted to take a walk with her. Since I too love the ocean, I consented, and we strolled from her house to the water. The sun began to set and we continued walking along the boardwalk talking about nothing in particular. She might have asked about whomever I was dating at the time, and I think she even offered some advice since she knew the woman I was seeing better than I did. Let me point out that Gloria's intuitive sensibility, what she would call her *coatlicue* state, seemed to rear its head quite often, and she always knew more, sensed more, than I could or did at the time. I often felt like a novice when I was with her and she was the patient, loving teacher/friend. Anyway, I might have probed about her love life, but she hardly ever spent much time discussing that with me. Maybe she saved that topic for more familiar friends. As the sun disappeared beyond the horizon, the light began to change. Golden sun and shadows fell away and suddenly a bluish tone absorbed the air. It was neither light nor dark. We could still see in front of us, but all objects were encircled with a shadowy, indigo aura. I became somewhat annoyed because my vision tends to deceive me at dusk. She, on the other hand, said, "You see this light; it's light, but it's also dark. It's in between night and day. My favorite time of day. When it's nighttime and daytime at once." I'd never focused on the light at dusk before, other than to want it to hurry up and change from one to the other. I realized at that moment that I had always been uncomfortable with that ambiguity. Suddenly, as if to see for the first time, I became aware of living between worlds, between seemingly opposites. I became aware of *nepantla*. It was a significant lesson for this student because I would think about this again and again for years to come, and as I theorized Chicana/o history, I used her concept of the in between to make sense of what I call the decolonial imaginary—that space between colonial and postcolonial. For me, Gloria's *nepantla* concept allowed me to think about the libratory space that Chicanas/os exist in today. Neither colonial nor postcolonial, we reside in that in between gap where we make sense of our agency. **[End Page 4]**

Collective consciousness bad

Williams 11 <http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/colorblind/201112/colorblind-ideology-is-form-racism>

Racism? Strong words, yes, but let's look the issue straight in its partially unseeing eye. In a colorblind society, White people, who are unlikely to experience disadvantages due to race, can effectively ignore racism in American life, justify the current social order, and feel more comfortable with their relatively privileged standing in society (Fryberg, 2010). Most minorities, however, who regularly encounter difficulties due to race, experience colorblind ideologies quite differently. Colorblindness creates a society that denies their negative racial experiences, rejects their cultural heritage, and invalidates their unique perspectives.¶ Let's break it down into simple terms: Color-Blind = "People of color — we don't see you (at least not that bad ‘colored' part)." As a person of color, I like who I am, and I don't want any aspect of that to be unseen or invisible. The need for colorblindness implies there is something shameful about the way God made me and the culture I was born into that we shouldn't talk about. Thus, colorblindness has helped make race into a taboo topic that polite people cannot openly discuss. And if you can't talk about it, you can't understand it, much less fix the racial problems that plague our society.